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DEVELOPING EXPOSURE-BASED PRECONCEPTION 
TORT LIABILITY: A SCIENTIFIC CHALLENGE TO 
TRADITIONAL TORT CONCEPTS 
Nicholas P. Putz+ 
As society progresses, human interaction with the environment becomes 
increasingly precarious.  According to many scholars, “[t]here is increasing 
acceptance of the assertion . . . that most human disease, if not all, is the result 
of the interaction between underlying genetic susceptibility and exposures to 
various components of the environment, including chemical, dietary, infectious, 
physical, and behavioral.”1  Unfortunately, the U.S. legal system has continually 
struggled to reconcile scientific advances with legal precedent and doctrinal tort 
concepts.2  Commonly referred to as a “preconception” tort, U.S. courts are 
                                               
 + J.D. Candidate, May 2017, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A., 
2014, Xavier University.  The author extends his most sincere gratitude to Mr. Adam Dinnell for 
his expertise and guidance in drafting this Comment.  The author is also grateful to his family and 
friends who have supported throughout his time in law school.  Finally, the author would like to 
extend his thanks to the Catholic University Law Review for its assistance in publishing this 
Comment. 
 1. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 418 (Sarah Boslaugh ed., 2008); see also Jamie A. 
Grodsky, Genetics and Environmental Law: Redefining Public Health, 93 CAL. L. REV. 171, 267–
68 (2005).  Grodsky asserts that: 
[t]he additional data yielded by new scientific capabilities might bolster the claims of 
populations affected by such risk. Information concerning environmental susceptibilities, 
exposure, and subclinical biological effects may serve as the ingredients for a new 
generation of tort claims based on injuries from chemical exposure, as well as increased 
risk in the absence of manifest injury. 
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 2. See, e.g., Lyria Bennett Moses, Understanding Legal Responses to Technological 
Change: The Example of In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 505, 515–16 (2005) 
(positing that, when dealing with scientific or technological advances, such as in vitro fertilization, 
“[t]he law is frequently accused of containing gaps, of being slow or outpaced and thus lagging 
behind technology, and of needing to respond to new technologies and address new issues”); 
Deborah Tuerkheimer, Science-Dependent Prosecution and the Problem of Epistemic 
Contingency: A Study of Shaken Baby Syndrome, 62 ALA. L. REV. 513, 526 (2011) (providing an 
analysis of how criminal proceedings relating to shaken baby syndrome, a concept that relies 
heavily on scientific evidence, had severely lagged behind scientific advances for a significant 
period of time); see generally Jamie A. Grodsky, Genomics and Toxic Torts: Dismantling the Risk-
Injury Divide, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1671, 1733–34 (2007).  Grodsky provides a vivid description of 
how medical advances challenge classic legal thinking: 
As the medical world leaps forward to prevent and treat disease at the subcellular level, 
the law’s traditional focus on overt, symptomatic disease is increasingly out of step with 
science.  New constellations of biological markers may indicate that bodily integrity has 
been compromised well before the appearance of classic symptoms.  By forcing plaintiffs 
to attain late-stage injury before seeking remedies, current toxic tort law may actually 
discourage medical interventions that could benefit both defendants and plaintiffs.  If the 
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extremely hesitant to extend recovery to plaintiffs who allegedly suffered an 
injury caused prior to conception from exposure to a hazardous substance.3  
However, what may be even more telling of this hesitancy is the reluctance of 
courts to extend recovery to injuries that resulted from hazardous exposure in 
utero.4  One of the most difficult challenges facing plaintiffs is the ability to 
establish a duty that often spans two to three generations, which often depends 
on whether the injury suffered was foreseeable at the time the parent or 
grandparent was affected.5  Additionally, as many causes of action are rooted in 
exposure to toxic or hazardous materials, plaintiffs also struggle to establish a 
clear and definite theory of causation.6  In general, courts have refused to uphold 
preconception tort actions for three main reasons: (1) there is no duty to 
subsequently conceived offspring;7 (2) it is difficult to establish causation by 
pinpointing genetic damage and tracing it back to a single incident;8 and (3) 
public policy does not favor recognizing preconception tort actions.9 
                                               
law remains wedded to conventional notions of injury, it will ignore the fruits of a 
scientific revolution and thus may forego preventive opportunities as yet unimagined. 
Id. See also Monroe E. Price, The Newness of New Technology, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1885, 1913 
(2001).  Price discusses the notion of a lagging judiciary within the context of technological 
advances, contending that: 
[l]aw moves more slowly than its external impacts and not always or immediately in 
parallel with them.  The development of law is imprisoned in the rhetoric of its prior 
existence.  That is the weakness, certainly of courts, but of legislatures as well.  Altered 
flows of information, resulting from new technologies, change the balances that 
previously existed in a legal framework.  But it is hard to know when those changes undo 
the preexisting formulaic approaches to a task. 
Id. 
 3. Julie A. Greenberg, Reconceptualizing Preconception Torts, 64 TENN. L. REV. 315, 342 
(1997). 
 4. Kardas v. Union Carbide Corp., 802 N.Y.S.2d 509, 510 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (holding 
that plaintiff who allegedly suffered profound brain damage due to repeated exposure of her father’s 
semen to contaminants did not have a preconception cause of action). 
 5. See Lough v. Rolla Women’s Clinic, Inc. 866 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Mo. 1993) (asserting that 
foreseeability is the paramount factor in determining existence of a duty). 
 6. See, e.g., Whitlock v. Pepsi Americas, 681 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1126 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 
(opining that future advances in science and medicine could make the attribution of injuries to 
chemical exposure clearer). 
 7. Hegyes v. Unjian Enters., Inc., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85, 101–02 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
 8. David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A ‘Public Law’ 
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 857 (1984) (“Epidemiologists can estimate the 
proportion of disease incidence attributable to the ‘excess risk’ created by the toxic agent and the 
proportion attributable to the ‘background risk’ – the cumulative risk attributable to all other 
factors.  But given current limits on our knowledge of the etiology of insidious diseases, and given 
the generality of statistical data, it is impossible to pinpoint the actual source of the disease afflicting 
any specific member of the exposed population.”). 
 9. Elsheref v. Applied Materials, Inc., 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 257, 265 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) 
(quoting Oddone v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. Rptr. 3d 867, 874 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009)) (“One of the 
consequences to the community of such an extension [of liability] is the cost of insuring against 
liability of unknown but potentially massive dimension.”). 
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There is minimal recognition of preconception tort actions throughout the 
U.S., often because of a strict adherence to the common tort concepts of duty 
and foreseeability by many courts.10  Thus, even with a clear line of causation, 
under certain circumstances, some courts continue to refuse to impose 
preconception tort liability.11  Perhaps most telling of the general refusal to 
recognize preconception torts, outside of a narrow line of cases, is the reliance 
on the misleading policy implications of imposing a duty in such scenarios.12 
In an effort to prevent overextending traditional tort concepts of duty and 
causation, many courts have strongly rejected preconception liability.13  A 
special relationship between the alleged tortfeasor and plaintiff provides one 
possible way by which to circumvent the foreseeability aspect of causation.14  
However, not only have some courts refused to recognize preconception tort 
liability absent a special relationship, but they have also consciously construed 
such relationships extremely narrowly.15  Because most of the hazardous 
exposure cases fall outside the scope of any special relationship, a lack of 
foreseeability and inability to pinpoint causation continues to be the demise of 
such actions.16 
This Comment begins with an analysis of potential recovery for genetic 
damage to one’s progeny resulting from hazardous exposure by examining the 
                                               
 10. See, e.g., Hegyes, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 104 (“We refuse to be persuaded by [the] notion that 
causation and injury are the sole determinants of liability.  The fundamental expression of the need 
in the law of negligence for a concept of duty and foreseeability was provided over 60 years ago in 
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., and has withstood the test of time.”) (citation omitted). 
 11. See, e.g., id. at 89 (noting that a duty to the unconceived in California exists only when a 
defendant’s conduct involves providing medical services or products relating to the reproductive 
process). 
 12. See, e.g., Elsheref, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 265; see also Daniel S. Goldberg, Against Genetic 
Exceptionalism: An Argument in Favor of the Viability of Preconception Genetic Torts, 10 J. 
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 259, 271 (2007) (“The major reason courts deny recovery for 
preconception genetic torts is fear of multiple-generation liability.  Courts are afraid that no 
practical limit on liability may exist.”). 
 13. Elsheref, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 265 (holding the employer of the plaintiff’s father owed no 
duty to the plaintiff to protect or warn of possible exposure to hazardous chemicals); Hegyes, 286 
Cal. Rptr. at 104 (holding that preconception duty only exists when a defendant’s conduct involves 
providing medical services or products directly related to the reproductive process); Albala v. City 
of New York, 429 N.E.2d 786, 787 (N.Y. 1981) (holding that recognizing a preconception cause 
of action stemming from medical negligence would extend traditional tort concepts too far). 
 14. Hegyes, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 104 (using special relationships to limit preconception liability 
by holding that a duty only exists when the defendant’s conduct involves providing medical 
services or products directly related to the reproductive process). 
 15. Compare Whitlock v. Pepsi Americas, 681 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1126 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 
(holding that no special relationship exists between a polluting landowner and neighbor which 
would impose a duty to an unconceived child), with Hegyes, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 104. 
 16. In re Asbestos Litig., No. 04C-07-099-ASB, 2007 WL 4571196, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. 
Dec. 21, 2007) (refusing to acknowledge a relationship which would give way to a legal duty of 
care between husband’s employer and the plaintiff wife, who was exposed to asbestos when 
washing her husband’s work clothes). 
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treatment of preconception torts in American Jurisprudence.  Next, this 
Comment focus on the two applicable legal principles of duty and causation, 
drawing on comparable tort duties and technological advances in genetic 
identification that could strengthen causation.  Finally, this Comment argues that 
causation and duty exist on a sliding scale.  Therefore, with advances in genetic 
identification strengthening causation, the duty component of the tort should 
become less stringent.  In response to policy implications that would arise from 
recognizing such a tort, this Comment proposes that the tort inherently limits 
itself, but if necessary, statutory regulation may be the best mechanism in 
preventing the tort from becoming uncontrollable. 
I.  PRECONCEPTION TORT LIABILITY—A COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENT OF 
LIABILITY AND CHALLENGES FACING INJURED PLAINTIFF 
A.  The Origin of the Preconception Tort 
Like any other tort, a preconception tort requires the plaintiff to establish duty, 
breach of duty, causation, and injury.17  However, because of the unique nature 
of preconception torts, especially those involving exposure, the elements 
necessary to establish a cause of action are malleable and much more complex 
than usual.18  Elements of causation and duty are particularly problematic, as 
evidenced by the difficulties plaintiffs face in establishing preconception 
liability.19 
1946 marked the first time a U.S. court recognized a cause of action for an 
injury to a child prior to birth, when the court in Bonbrest v. Kotz20 reasoned that 
the child was viable or “one capable of living outside the womb.”21  Since then, 
courts have wrestled with how best to approach these controversial causes of 
action.22  In 1963, Jorgenson v. Meade Johnson Labs.23 undercut the viability 
test articulated in Bonbrest by recognizing a right of recovery for a wrongful 
                                               
 17. See, e.g., Christopher M. Ernst, 3 Baldwin’s Oh. Prac. Tort L. § 17:2 (2015) (“A 
preconception negligence claim must satisfy all the elements of a traditional negligence cause of 
action.”). 
 18. Christopher J. Wiener, Transgenerational Tort Liability for Epigenetic Disease, 13 
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 319, 328–30 (2011) (“Three elements [duty of care to the unborn and 
their progeny, generational causation, legally cognizable injuries] of a negligence claim are 
particularly problematic when confronting a claim for transgenerational epigenetic harm . . .”). 
 19. Id. 
 20. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C 1946). 
 21. Id. at 140. 
 22. The predicament facing the courts today revolves around reconciling century-old 
doctrinal tort concepts with modern scientific and medical advances.  Courts view challenges to 
these doctrinal concepts, such as duty and foreseeability, as the first in what would be a wave of 
limitless litigation.  In confronting these challenges, the courts have mostly defended such concepts, 
relying on an array of rationale—policy, tortfeasor relationship and legislative specialization.  See 
infra Section I.B. 
 23. 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973). 
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action that occurred prior to conception.24  Subsequently, courts have applied 
the rationale of Jorgenson and recognized preconception tort liability because 
the child’s existence triggers the ability to recover.25  Preconception tort actions 
of this type have been successful, in part, because of the definite causation link 
traceable from the injury to the defendant.26  However, the recognition of 
preconception tort liability in Jorgenson and Renslow did not lead to widespread 
acceptance of preconception tort liability throughout the United States, as courts 
have limited the applicability of these holdings to a subset of factually identical 
cases.27 
B.  The Pot Calling the Kettle Black: The Arbitrary Refusal of Courts not to 
Impose a Preconception Duty 
Much less scientific than the causation aspect of preconception torts, the 
question of duty turns almost solely on policy.  Embedded in these policy 
considerations is the hardened concept of foreseeability, established by Judge 
Cardozo in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.28  According to Cardozo, 
negligence is “a term of relation.”29  Thus, one does not owe a duty to 
unforeseeable plaintiffs.30  Some courts have been weary of imposing a duty to 
the unconceived solely on the basis of an inability to reconcile foreseeable 
liability and endless liability.31  Because courts must consider the repercussions 
                                               
 24. Id. at 240 (noting one would not deny recovery to an infant suffering injury as a result of 
a defective food product manufactured prior to conception). 
 25. See, e.g., Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (Ill. 1977) (holding that 
“there is a right to be born free from prenatal injuries foreseeably caused by a breach of duty to the 
child’s mother” but injury can only occur after existence, not prior); see also David S. Steefel, 
Preconception Torts: Foreseeing the Unconceived Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 48 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 621, 624 (1977) (noting that this constitutes “a biological approach to justify recovery for 
preconception torts”). 
 26. In Renslow, causation was premised on the well-established medical fact that Rh-positive 
blood is never transfused with Rh-negative blood, thus effectively eliminating the need for the court 
to grapple with complex causation issues.  Renslow, 367 N.E.2d at 1253. 
 27. Greenberg, supra note 3, at 335–41.  Greenberg notes that courts have limited the 
recognition of preconception liability with most states willing only to recognize preconception 
liability in medical malpractice actions and products liability action.  Id.  In 1997, only three states 
had considered whether to impose preconception liability outside of medical malpractice and 
preconception liability, with Indiana being the only state to allow the cause of action to proceed to 
trial.  Id. at 340–41. 
 28. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
 29. Id. at 101. 
 30. Id. (“If the harm was not willful, he must show that the act as to him had possibilities of 
danger so many and apparent as to entitle him to be protected against the doing of it though the 
harm was unintended.”). 
 31. See, e.g., Albala v. City of New York, 429 N.E.2d 786, 787 (N.Y. 1981) (holding that 
recognizing a preconception cause of action stemming from medical negligence would extend 
traditional tort concepts too far). 
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of their holdings, the concern of overextending liability by recognizing a duty to 
the unconceived is quite common.32 
1.  Adherence to Foreseeability in Preventing Limitless Liability 
Albala v. City of New York33 was a case in which the argument in favor of 
finding preconception tort liability appeared to be strong.  However, the Court 
of Appeals of New York refused to recognize any such action.34  In Albala, the 
plaintiff’s mother suffered a damaged uterus when she underwent an abortion.35  
Four years after the negligently administered abortion, the plaintiff was born 
with severe brain damage, allegedly caused by the mother’s damaged uterus.36  
In holding that the plaintiff did not have a cognizable cause of action, the court 
noted the “staggering implications of any proposition which would honor claims 
assuming the breach of an identifiable duty for less than a perfect birth and by 
what standard and the difficulty in establishing a standard or definition of 
perfection.”37 
Echoing Albala, Catherwood v. American Sterilizer Co.38 refused to consider 
the possibility of recovery for a plaintiff alleging that her mother’s exposure to 
a hazardous substance caused chromosomal damage.39  The court acknowledged 
that New York had “carefully avoided opening the doors to litigation by 
plaintiffs claiming injury due to acts of defendants before their birth[,]” and thus, 
reiterated that it would abide by precedent in refusing to recognize a duty to the 
unconceived.40 
In Hegyes v. Unjian Enterprises, Inc.,41 a California court discussed the 
importance of foreseeability in preconception cases, noting: 
[w]e refuse to be persuaded by [the] notion that causation and injury 
are the sole determinants of liability.  The fundamental expression of 
the need in the law of negligence for a concept of duty and 
foreseeability was provided over 60 years ago in Palsgraf v. Long 
Island R. Co., and has withstood the test of time.”42 
                                               
 32. See, e.g., id. (“We are of the opinion that the recognition of a cause of action under these 
circumstances would require the extension of traditional tort concepts beyond manageable 
bounds”). 
 33. 428 N.E.2d 786 (N.Y. 1981). 
 34. Id. at 788. 
 35. Id. at 787. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 273 (citing Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 411 (N.Y. 1978)) (citation omitted). 
 38. 498 N.Y.S.2d 703 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986). 
 39. Id. at 705. 
 40. Id. at 706. 
 41. 286 Cal. Rptr. 85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
 42. Id. at 104 (citation omitted). 
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In Hegyes, the plaintiff’s mother was injured in a car accident two years prior 
to conception.43  Directly following the accident, the mother was fitted with a 
lumbo-peritoneal shunt,44 which eventually caused the plaintiff’s premature 
birth and resulted in various personal injuries.45  The court held that the 
defendant owed no legal duty to the subsequently conceived child, as the 
defendant’s conduct of driving negligently “was not ‘likely to result’ in 
plaintiff’s conception or birth, let alone her alleged injuries nearly three years 
after the car accident.”46  Although unrelated to any type of exposure or genetic 
damage, Hegyes remains a seminal preconception tort case, as it underlines the 
reluctance of courts to impose an unforeseeable duty or limitless liability on a 
preconception tortfeasor.47 
Policy rationale, although much different in nature, was yet again the demise 
of a preconception tort in Peters v. Texas Instruments Inc.,48 where the plaintiff 
alleged that his father’s exposure to toxic substances at work caused him to be 
born with several birth defects, including partial blindness.49  Distinct from the 
policy rationale of Albala, the court acknowledged that Texas precedent 
established that it was the role of the legislature, rather than the judiciary, to 
recognize such complex actions.50  In support of this, the court cited a prior 
Texas case which pointed to the necessity of research and analysis of scientific 
and medical data, and the development of specific laws to address the findings—
a procedure unique to the legislature.51 
                                               
 43. Id. at 86. 
 44. Id.  A lumbar-peritoneal shunt is a tube inserted between two vertebrae in the lumbar 
portion of the spine to redirect excess fluid.  Spinal Shunt, BEAUMONT, www.beaumont.edu/ 
neuroscience/neurological-treatments-services/spinal-shunt (last visited Nov. 7, 2016). 
 45. Hegyes, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 86. 
 46. Id. at 101. 
 47. See, e.g., Whitlock v. Pepsi Americas, 681 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1126–27 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 
(holding that “to date no California courts have found a duty to a preconception plaintiff for torts 
unrelated to the reproduction context. Hegyes has been the law in California for 19 years.”). 
 48. C.A. No. 10C–06–043 JRJ, 2011 WL 4686518 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2011). 
 49. Id. at *1. 
 50. Id. at *7. 
To the extent a workable standard of care could be developed or the scope of conduct to 
which the standard is applied could be limited, it would only be through extensive 
research and analysis of scientific and medical data, an evaluation of broad matters of 
public policy, and the development of specific laws to address the concerns and needs of 
the citizenry.  These matters are uniquely within the realm of the legislature, not the 
judiciary.  It is the legislature’s role to reflect the values of its constituents in its creation 
of laws. 
Id. (quoting Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474, 478 (Tex. App. 1999) (emphasis in original). 
 51. Id. at *6–7 (citing Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 477-78). 
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2.  Narrowly Construing Special Relationships to Limit Duty to the 
Unconceived 
When deciding whether to impose a duty, courts have regularly looked to the 
relationship between the alleged tortfeasor and the plaintiff.52  Many successful 
plaintiffs have relied on special relationships53 to convince courts to recognize a 
duty to the unconceived.54  However, courts continue to emphasize the narrow 
applicability of such relationships.55  Thus, because most, if not all, hazardous 
exposure cases fall outside the scope of any special relationship, the inability to 
establish foreseeability continues to be the demise of such actions.56 
In Rodriguez v. Intel Corp.,57 a Delaware state court rejected the plaintiff’s 
attempt to establish a special relationship and declined to impose a duty on the 
defendant.58  In Rodriguez, the plaintiff alleged that her father’s preconception 
exposure to reproductively harmful chemicals while working at the defendants’ 
factories caused severe birth defects.59  Although the relationship between the 
father and the defendants may have been sufficient to impose a duty, the court 
held that a preconception duty would not be recognized because the plaintiff did 
not demonstrate a special relationship between the defendants and the plaintiff 
child.60 
Similarly, the California Court of Appeals has narrowly construed special 
relationships, holding that an employer/employee relationship does not establish 
a duty to the employee’s unconceived children.61  In Elsheref, the plaintiff 
alleged that his father’s preconception exposure to toxic chemicals, while 
working at the defendant’s factory, caused multiple birth defects.62  Concluding 
that the workplace relationship was not sufficient to establish a special 
relationship, not only did the court hold that the defendant did not have a duty 
to protect the plaintiff, but the court also held that the defendant did not have a 
duty to warn the plaintiff’s father that certain chemicals may pose a danger to 
                                               
 52. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Intel Corp., C.A. No. N11C–08–029 JRJ, 2014 WL 605472, at *7 
(Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2014) (holding that a preconception duty to the plaintiff could not be 
imposed absent the existence of a special relationship). 
 53. For example, a relationship like “physician-patient” constitutes a special relationship.  
Hegyes v. Unjian Enterprises, Inc., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85, 87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
 54. See id. at 90, 93, 94–95 (“[C]ase law imposes liability only when there is a ‘special 
relationship’ between the defendant and the mother giving rise to a duty to the minor plaintiff.  The 
defendant’s conduct in those cases is inextricably related to the inevitable future pregnancy, a key 
element missing from the present facts.”) (emphasis in original). 
 55. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 56. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 2014 WL 605472, at *6–8. 
 57. C.A. No. N11C–08–029 JRJ, 2014 WL 605472 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2014). 
 58. Id. at *1, *7. 
 59. Id. at *1. 
 60. Id. at *7. 
 61. See Elsheref v. Applied Materials, Inc., 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 257, 265 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014). 
 62. See id. at 260. 
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his unborn children.63  By refusing to impose a duty to warn, Elsheref moved a 
step further than most courts, thereby exemplifying the reluctance of courts to 
impose any sort of preconception duty.64 
C.  Establishing Causation Without Actually Establishing Causation 
One would think that advances in science and technology may afford courts 
the ability to more easily recognize preconception torts, but this is often not the 
case.65  However, the need to properly compensate victims and deter wrongful 
conduct may begin to push courts to think differently.66  Regardless, paintiffs 
face an upward battle in convincing a court that a single substance or action is 
responsible for an injury, given that humans are exposed to a variety of 
chemicals and substances on a daily basis.67  Plaintiffs must not only 
demonstrate that a substance or product is able to cause an injury, but also that 
the resulting harm is directly attributable to that substance or product—what are 
commonly referred to as general and specific causation, respectively.68 
1.  General Causation 
a.  Epidemiological Causation 
The use of epidemiological evidence is the most common way to prove 
general causation.69  Epidemiological evidence establishes cause and effect by 
                                               
 63. See id at 265. 
 64. Compare id. (refusing to impose a duty to warn), with supra notes 33–51 and 
accompanying text (courts refusing to impose a duty of care, but not reaching the question of duty 
to warn). 
 65. See Allison Hite, Who’s to Blame?: How Genetic Information Will Lead to More Accurate 
Decisions in Toxic Tort Litigation, 63 S.C. L. REV. 1031, 1031 (2012) (“In the absence of the 
exacting science that courts crave, decisions in toxic tort cases are often based on mere inferences.”) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 66. See Steefel, supra note 25, at 625 (noting that “[t]he birth of children with debilitating 
physical injuries imposes undesirable costs on society” and “to the extent that the tort law is 
compensatory, it is irrelevant whether the plaintiff exists when the tortious conduct initially 
occurs.”). 
 67. See Danielle Conway-Jones, Factual Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation: A Philosophical 
View of Proof and Certainty in Uncertain Disciplines, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 875, 881–82 (2002) 
(“Because a toxic exposure plaintiff may have encountered various background risks, proving that 
the specific toxin caused her injury strongly militates against a finding of factual causation in 
today’s legal climate.”). 
 68. Albert C. Lin, Beyond Tort: Compensating Victims of Environmental Toxic Injury, 78 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1439, 1447–51 (2005). 
 69. See Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d 878, 882 (10th Cir. 2005) (“We agree 
with the district court that epidemiology is the best evidence of general causation in a toxic tort 
case.”); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1403 (D. Or. 1996) (“The existence 
or nonexistence of relevant epidemiology can be a significant factor in proving general causation 
in toxic tort cases.”); Neal C. Stout, Judging the Reliability of Expert Causation Opinions Based 
on Epidemiology Data After King v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company: Is the Judge 
a Gatekeeper or a Matador?, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1049, 1052 (2010) (“Epidemiology is a 
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“comparing the incidence of disease across exposed and unexposed populations, 
or comparing the incidence of exposure across sick and healthy populations.”70  
Therefore, epidemiological evidence does not establish that an injury directly 
resulted from exposure, but merely that it could have resulted from such 
exposure.71  Although plaintiffs cannot rely solely upon epidemiological 
evidence to establish causation, courts have noted the important role the 
evidence plays in demonstrating a plausible link between exposure and injury.72  
Absent the ability to show anything more than a mere probability, plaintiffs must 
provide scientific evidence that gives courts the opportunity to reach a concrete 
conclusion.73 
b.  Temporal Causation 
If unable to rely on a scientific connection, plaintiffs may attempt to prove 
general causation by showing a temporal relationship between exposure and 
injury.74  Under Daubert, most courts do not consider a temporal connection 
alone to be sufficient proof of causation.75  However, “[a] temporal, or 
chronological, relationship must exist for causation to exist.”76  For plaintiffs 
alleging injury stemming from preconception exposure, temporal evidence has 
                                               
branch of science focusing on the question of general causation, that is, whether a substance is 
capable of causing a particular disease.”). 
 70. Steve Gold, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of Persuasion, and 
Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376, 379–80 (1986). 
 71. Michael Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 608–09 (3d ed. 2011) (noting that specific causation is beyond epidemiology 
and that “epidemiologists investigate whether an agent can cause a disease, not whether an agent 
did cause a specific plaintiff’s disease”). 
 72. See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1239–40 (E.D.N.Y. 
1985), aff’d sub nom, In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig. MDL No. 381, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 
1987) (“In a mass tort case such as Agent Orange, epidemiologic studies on causation assume a 
role of critical importance . . .[and] [c]ommentators have approved the growing judicial reliance on 
such scientific evidence.”). 
 73. Gold, supra note 70, at 379-80 (“[I]n an individual case, epidemiology cannot 
conclusively prove causation; at best, it can establish only a certain probability that a randomly 
selected case of disease was one that would not have occurred absent exposure, or the ‘relative risk’ 
of the exposed population.”). 
 74. Alani Golanski, General Causation at A Crossroads in Toxic Tort Cases, 108 PENN ST. 
L. REV. 479, 508 (2003). 
 75. See Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 273 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc).  In 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., the Supreme Court developed a list of factors for 
admissibility of scientific expert testimony under Fed. Rule Evid. 702, articulating that courts are 
to consider 1) whether the scientific methodology can be tested; 2) whether the technique has been 
subject to peer review or publication; 3) whether there is a known or potential error rate; 4) the 
existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation and 5) whether the 
methodology is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–94 (1993). 
 76. Green et al., supra note 71, at 601. 
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minimal utility, given the lengthy period between exposure and actual injury.77  
Still, temporal evidence provides a causal link between the initial exposure and 
the corresponding genetic damage regardless of how many years ago the event 
may have occurred.78 
For example, in Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc.,79 the plaintiff alleged that his 
exposure to a toxic chemical caused reactive airways dysfunction syndrome.80  
With just a few months separating the exposure and his diagnosis, the plaintiff 
attempted to use the temporal relationship as evidence of causation.81  The court 
rejected this reasoning, holding that, absent any scientific evidence, and “[i]n the 
absence of an established specific connection between exposure and illness . . . 
the temporal connection between exposure to chemicals and an onset of 
symptoms, standing alone, is entitled to little weight in determining causation.”82 
However, some courts have allowed such evidence to be introduced.  For 
example, in Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB83 the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit allowed the plaintiff to introduce expert testimony relating the 
temporal proximity of exposure to the onset and worsening of sinus problems as 
evidence of causation.84  The court reasoned that “depending on the 
circumstances, a temporal relationship between exposure to a substance and the 
onset of a disease or a worsening of symptoms can provide compelling evidence 
of causation.”85 
2.  Specific Causation 
Needing to show more than the capability of a substance to cause injury, 
plaintiffs have struggled to demonstrate a definite connection between exposure 
and injury.86  Some courts have required plaintiffs prove that “a defendant’s 
conduct more than doubled the plaintiff’s risk of injury” in order to establish 
                                               
 77. Id. at 601–02. 
 78. Id. at 601. 
 79. 151 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 80. Id. at 272. 
 81. Id. at 278 (citing Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 F. Supp. 756, 772–73 (E.D. Va. 1995)) (“The 
proffered expert relied substantially on the temporal proximity between exposure and symptoms.”). 
 82. Id. 
 83. 178 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 84. Id. at 265. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Golanski, supra note 74, at 487 (“Establishing specific causation under traditional 
standards would be ‘oppressively problematic’ in the toxic tort area because these cases typically 
involve long latency periods between exposure and illness, as well as disease types that may be 
associated with multiple causal factors.  At the same time, the specific causation requirement 
usually endures in some form, and plaintiffs who establish a substance’s general harmful propensity 
may still fail to demonstrate that it probably caused their injury.”); Lin, supra note 68, at 1449–52; 
see also Joseph Sanders, Apportionment and Proof in Toxic Injury Cases, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 200, 202 (2000) (noting that “[s]pecific causation evidence seems to be the holy grail of 
toxic torts”). 
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causation beyond a preponderance of the evidence.87  Although this requirement 
is essentially synonymous to extremely strong epidemiological evidence, 
without any mechanisms that provide absolute certainty, courts are forced to 
make a judgment call.88  Thus, with respect to specific causation, 
epidemiological evidence can only show an extremely high probability that the 
relative risk of injury was doubled.89  Without any absolute conclusiveness, 
defendants utilize experts to undermine the certainty of causation.90 
a.  Toxicogenomics 
With plaintiffs struggling to establish causation, toxicogenomics might 
provide the solution plaintiffs are seeking.  An emerging scientific field, 
toxicogenomics analyzes the “impact of potentially toxic compounds on gene 
expression.”91  Although the admissibility of toxicological evidence is often 
more controversial than the admissibility of epidemiological evidence, such 
evidence can provide heightened levels of specificity.92  For example, 
toxicogenomics “permit[s] researchers to isolate the effects of exposure to a 
                                               
 87. Lin, supra note 68, at 1449–52 (emphasis omitted); Green et al., supra note 71, at 612 
(“Courts . . . have permitted expert witnesses to testify to specific causation based on the logic of 
the effect of a doubling of the risk.”). 
 88. See generally Lin, supra note 68, at 1449–52 (discussing the different methods courts use 
to determine causation). 
 89. Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of 
Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2126–28 (1997); David E. Bernstein, Getting to 
Causation in Toxic Tort Cases, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 51, 54 (2008) (“[T]he plaintiff must show that 
the exposure at issue did not simply slightly raise the hypothetical risk of injury, but in fact more 
than doubled the risk of the harm.  Courts, borrowing scientific terminology, often refer to the 
doubling of the risk as a ‘relative risk’ of greater than two.  In legal terms, this equates to ensuring 
that a preponderance of the evidence shows that the relevant exposure was the cause of his injury.”). 
 90. Berger, supra note 89, at 2129–29 (“In summary, the scientific evidence relied on to prove 
causation is subject to numerous kinds of uncertainty.”); see also Conway-Jones, supra note 67, at 
884–85.  A discussion by Conway-Jones about background risks is indicative of another way in 
which to inject uncertainty into causation: 
One external problem is the existence of background risks that may cause a harm similar 
to the type of harm that could also be caused by exposure to a toxic substance.  Scientific 
proof must isolate, or at the very least, account for background risks before plaintiffs can 
affirmatively state, with sufficient mathematical probability, that a toxic exposure is 
causally related to or associated with a disease or injury.  The persistent reality is that 
populations in industrialized communities are exposed to multiple natural, as well as 
artificial, byproducts that may affect individuals as readily as any exposure to a toxic 
substance. 
Id. at 884. 
 91. John C. Childs, Toxicogenomics: New Chapter in Causation and Exposure in Toxic Tort 
Litigation, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 441, 441 (2002); see also Bernard D. Goldstein & Mary Sue Henifin, 
Reference Guide on Toxicology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 401, 403 (2d 
ed. 2011) (quoting CASARETT AND DOULL’S TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS 13 
(Curtis D. Klaassen ed., 5th ed. 1996) (“[Toxicogenomics] is ‘the study of the adverse effects of 
chemicals on living organisms.’”). 
 92. Goldstein & Henifin, supra note 91, at 413–14. 
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single chemical or to known mixtures . . . offer[ing] unique information 
concerning dose-response relationships, mechanisms of action, specificity of 
response, and other information relevant to the assessment of causation.”93 By 
analyzing how different environmental interactions impact gene expression, 
toxicogenomics can provide highly conclusive evidence of disease causation.94 
The most popular monitoring method is a DNA microarray, which provides 
“simultaneous monitoring of gene expression levels . . . .”95  Scientists are able 
to identify sources of acquired disease, genetic mutations caused by exposure, 
and the degree to which certain toxins are responsible for the onset of disease.96  
The strength of this evidence faces the same challenges as epidemiological 
evidence because scientists have been unable to isolate other variables or 
discount individual susceptibility to disease.97  However, it is certainly a stronger 
indicator of causation than the probabilistic epidemiological evidence and may 
provide the strongest path to relief for plaintiffs.98 
II.  CIRCUMVENTING STRICT NOTIONS OF PRECONCEPTION TORT LIABILITY 
While the decision of whether to recognize preconception tort liability appears 
clear cut on the surface, it is actually anything but clear.99  A crucial factor to 
consider is the degree to which this type of liability is linked to century old, 
doctrinal tort concepts.  The fear of disturbing the interpretation of such concepts 
weighs heavily on courts examining preconception tort actions.100  However, the 
                                               
 93. Id. at 414. 
 94. Childs, supra note 91, at 441–42.  Childs provides a concise overview of toxicogenomics, 
stating: 
It is the study of the impact of potentially toxic compounds on gene expression.  A gene 
“expresses itself” by acting on proteins and other body processes in very complex ways 
to affect how the body grows and develops.  Toxicogenomics is the study of the alteration 
of those mechanisms that leads to conclusions about disease and disease processes. 
Id. 
 95. Id. at 442. 
 96. Id. at 443. 
 97. Id. at 444 (“The task of clearly separately out and assigning causation to a discrete 
exposure is complicated by genetic variables affecting individual susceptibility.  Every disease will 
have a genetic component to its causation.”). 
 98. Id. 
“The value of toxicogenomics to toxic tort litigators is quite apparent.  For plaintiffs who 
have insufficient scientific proof that a product was more likely than not to cause cancer, 
the ability to show that an exposure to the product resulted in a genetic polymorphism or 
gene sequence difference, which increased cancer susceptibility, could be outcome 
determinative.” 
Id. 
 99. John G. Taylor, Defendant Liability to Plaintiffs Neither Conceived Nor Born at the Time 
of Initial Exposure to A Toxic Substance or Drug, 4 PROD. LIAB. L.J. 224, 232 (1993) (“The few 
jurisdictions which have had the opportunity to address the preconception tort issue have split as to 
whether a cause of action should be recognized.”). 
 100. See, e.g., Albala v. City of New York, 429 N.E.2d 786, 787–88 (N.Y. 1981) (holding that 
the recognition of a preconception cause of action stemming from medical negligence would extend 
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fact that tort concepts are grounded in a mindset that never envisioned 
technological advances capable of both causing and identifying injury certainly 
perpetuates a rigid interpretation.101 For the most part, courts continue to balk at 
the opportunity to reconcile doctrinal tort concepts with modern preconception 
torts.102  To date, the courts that recognize preconception liability have done so 
with so many caveats that any sort of majority consensus has yet to be reached.103  
The threads of reasoning on both sides of the issue are explored below. 
A.  The Great Flood of Litigation (Or Not) 
Courts are extremely reluctant to establish precedent that may allow for 
limitless liability.104  These policy considerations are often at the forefront when 
preconception liability is limited.105  No court wants to be the first to test the 
waters of recognizing a duty to the unconceived because doing so could impose 
a duty to an unknown and unpredictable population.106  Implicit in the discussion 
                                               
traditional tort concepts too far); see also Steve C. Gold, When Certainty Dissolves into Probability: 
A Legal Vision of Toxic Causation for the Post-Genomic Era, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 237, 239 
(2013) (Proof of toxic tort claims conforms poorly to the traditional deterministic legal model of 
but-for causation, because toxic injuries almost never involve an observable chain of physical 
events allowing easy inference of a causal relation between a particular defendant’s conduct and a 
particular plaintiff’s harm.  Courts turn to science to replace causal intuition, but a disjunction 
remains between the probabilities that science can know and the determined result that the law 
wants proven.”). 
 101. Gold, supra note 100, at 321–22. 
 102. Id. at 239. 
 103. See, e.g., Hegyes v. Unjian Enterprises, Inc., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85, 90, 94, 101 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1991) (recognizing that “[i]n a nonmedical preconception negligence case where there is no alleged 
‘special relationship,’ it becomes more difficult to find a legal duty owed to the minor child and, 
hence, liability on the part of defendant”). 
 104. Albala, 429 N.E.2d at 788 (“Unlimited hypotheses accompanied by staggering 
implications are manifest.  The perimeters of liability although a proper legislative concern, in cases 
such as these, cannot be judicially established in a reasonable and practical manner.”); see also 
Taylor, supra note 99, at 232 (contending that premising refusal to recognize preconception liability 
on being unable to limit liability “is unsatisfactory both in terms of legal policy and because it is 
unfounded”). 
 105. See Goldberg, supra note 12, at 270 (noting that “the divergence between courts in 
extending or restraining the boundaries of a particular duty rests on conflicting policy analyses, 
rather than any disagreements about whether a legal mandate compels a particular boundary”); see 
also supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 106. Greenberg, supra note 3, at 341. 
“The courts that bar all preconception actions, or severely limit the duty owed in 
preconception actions, have articulated the following concerns as justification for their 
actions: if courts open the door to recovery in any preconception action, a flood of 
litigation will ensue; if courts allow recovery to a child who was not conceived at the 
time of the negligent act, claims may be brought by successive future generations; if 
liability is imposed too far into the future, problems measuring insurance risks and the 
exorbitant costs of insurance may place an excessive burden on the defendant and 
society; and if recovery is allowed in medical malpractice actions, physicians may be 
faced with a conflict of interest between treating the mother or taking precautionary 
measures to protect a plaintiff who has not yet been conceived.” 
2016] A Scientific Challenge to Traditional Tort Concepts 489 
of limitless liability stemming from the imposition of a preconception duty is the 
concept of multi-generational liability.107 Because courts have been unable to 
devise a consistent, rational method by which to limit such liability and do not 
favor denying recovery simply because of the plaintiff’s generation, often the 
only logical solution is to deny recovery for any preconception tort.108 
Professor Daniel Goldberg notes that the ability of courts to arbitrarily favor 
different policies when imposing duties heavily contributes to the schism 
between those recognizing and not recognizing preconception tort duties.109  
Thus, plaintiffs may simply be out of luck if faced with a judiciary that refuses 
to recognize a preconception action on the basis of policy considerations 
informed by foreseeability and duty.110 
However, scholars have articulated strong points showing that such limitless 
liability is highly unlikely.  First, as previously discussed, plaintiffs already face 
an uphill battle in simply establishing a liability because of the potential for 
multi-generational liability, which essentially operates a market force in limiting 
liability at the outset.111  Second, because of the rare combination of events that 
give rise to preconception torts, litigation in this area has been minimal, 
indicating that a flood of litigation would not follow an expansion of 
preconception liability.112  Although these seemingly inherent limitations to the 
preconception cause of action may prove to be viable, it is unlikely that courts 
that have repeatedly refused to expand preconception tort liability would be 
persuaded by this rationale.113  Therefore, plaintiffs must succinctly prove 
preconception actions with a level of specificity that would itself impose a 
limitation. 
                                               
Id. 
 107. Id. at 345. 
 108. See Catherwood v. American Sterilizer Co., 498 N.Y.S.2d 703, 705 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) 
(referencing the decision of Albala as being “purely one of policy” with both the majority and 
dissent noting that “the alleged injuries to the plaintiff therein were foreseeable, causally related 
and resulted in ascertainable damages”); see also Goldberg, supra note 12, at 271–72. 
 109. Id. at 270–71. 
 110. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 111. See Goldberg, supra note 12, at 273. 
 112. Greenberg, supra note 3, at 342 (noting that in the twenty-four years prior to when her 
paper was written, appellate “courts have reported fewer than fifty preconception injury [tort] 
cases”); see also Goldberg, supra note 12, at 280 (“Simply banning preconception genetic torts by 
declaring that they are not viable claims is ill-advised.  As nearly all courts specifically addressing 
the problem have noted explicitly or implicitly, preconception genetic torts pose novel and 
challenging issues.”). 
 113. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 3, at 327–29.  One such jurisdiction is New York, where 
the courts had the opportunity to impose preconception liability four times, but declined on the 
ground of limitless liability fears in three of the four cases.  Id. 
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B.  Evidentiary Standards Preclude the Opportunity to Establish 
Preconception Tort Liability 
Currently, establishing causation is one of the most significant barriers to a 
plaintiff’s attempt to recover for a preconception tort.  Courts have explicitly 
indicated this when rejecting preconception claims.114  The problem for many 
plaintiffs is not the fact that the physical causation is weak, but rather that the 
mode by which to present evidence of causation to the court is seemingly 
impossible.115  Some scholars have proposed that without changes in evidentiary 
standards, it may be impossible for plaintiffs to meet the requisite standard of 
causation.116  However, it is highly unlikely that courts will modify evidentiary 
standards simply because a small group of plaintiffs is struggling to meet the 
current evidentiary standards. 
Advancements in genetics could provide plaintiffs with sufficient proof to 
establish causation in preconception actions.117  Currently, one of the most 
accurate methods is the use of biomarkers, which track toxins and the specific 
interactions with the body that lead to the development of a disease.118  Even if 
such evidence were permitted to be used in the courtroom, it would likely 
accompany scientific expert testimony.119  Due to the complexity of both the 
studies and the biomarker evidence, the generally accepted interpretation of 
Daubert could exclude the evidence if the court deems any of the methodology 
to be flawed.120 Given the emerging nature of genetic evidence, modern 
evidentiary standards may again pose significant problems to plaintiffs. 
C.  Timing is Everything: When the Harm Occurs and its Impact on 
Preconception Torts 
What may seem to be rather unimportant has actually played a significant role 
in the analysis of preconception liability. Courts and scholars use the time at 
which an injury from a preconception tort occurs as a reason to advocate for and 
                                               
 114. See Whitlock v. Pepsi Americas, 681 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1125–27 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 
(holding that absent the ability of DNA to attribute an injury directly to the alleged tortfeasor, 
causation is not strong enough make an injury foreseeable). 
 115. Gold, supra note 70, at 379–80 (“The basic impossibility of proving individual causation 
distinguishes toxic tort cases from ordinary personal injury suits.  Cancers and mutations provide 
no physical evidence of the inducing agent, so direct observation of individual plaintiffs provides 
little or no evidence of causation in many instances.”); see also Charles L. Moore, Comment, 
Radiation and Preconception Injuries: Some Interesting Problems in Tort Law, 28 SW L.J. 414, 
423–24 (1974). 
 116. See Goldberg, supra note 12, at 274–75. 
 117. See Gary E. Marchant, Genetic Data in Toxic Tort Litigation, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 7, 7–8 
(2006). 
 118. Goldberg, supra note 12, at 280–81. 
 119. Gary E. Marchant, Genetic Susceptibility and Biomarkers in Toxic Injury Litigation, 41 
JURIMETRICS 67, 86–87 (2000). 
 120. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 746 (3d Cir. 1994) (establishing the 
high level of accuracy courts demand for expert scientific testimony to be admitted). 
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against preconception tort liability.121  Two seminal cases, Jorgenson and 
Catherwood, limited liability because the injury occurred after conception.122  
Some have suggested that this is merely a pleading problem that can be solved 
by pleading with a greater degree of specificity.123  However, as technology 
advances and the reliance on genetic evidence increases, more accurate 
pleadings may not solve the problem.124  If plaintiffs allege an injury to progeny 
from a genetic mutation—the alteration of the chromosome had to have occurred 
prior to conception—thus eliminating recovery in courts that do not recognize 
preconception injury, but only injury to a viable fetus.125 
D.  Twenty-First Century Challenges to Traditional Tort Concepts 
Free from the restraint of archaic legal concepts, groundbreaking scientific 
and medical studies have reached conclusions many courts refuse to consider as 
remotely possible.126  More specifically, these studies concerning the interaction 
between the environment and human genes have expounded on mutations by 
genetic and epigenetic mechanisms.127 
For example, environmental toxicants, known as endocrine disruptors, “can 
induce transgenerational disease states or abnormalities . . . .”128 One particular 
study specifically demonstrated that vinclozolin, a fungicide used in vineyards, 
                                               
 121. Compare Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (Ill. 1977) (“This court 
has long recognized that a duty may exist to one foreseeably harmed though he be unknown and 
remote in time and place.”), with Goldberg, supra note 12, at 269–70: 
Whether or not chromosomal damage is seen as an actionable injury has many 
implications for the viability of claims such as increased risk of cancer.  Perhaps much 
of this may turn upon the pleadings themselves.  If the plaintiff in Catherwood had pled 
that the exposure occurred before conception and the injuries occurred subsequent to 
conception, as did the plaintiffs in Jorgensen, perhaps the New York court would have 
decided differently. 
 122. See Jorgenson v. Meade Johnson Labs., Inc., 483 F.2d 237, 239–40 (10th Cir. 1973) 
(noting that actionable preconception torts are limited only to injuries occurring after conception); 
see also Catherwood v. American Sterilizer Co., 498 N.Y.S.2d 703, 706 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) 
(denying a preconception tort action on the basis that the injury occurred prior to conception). 
 123. See Goldberg, supra note 12, at 269. 
 124. See id. at 269–70 (speculating as to whether more accurate pleadings would have changed 
the court’s decision in the Catherwood case). 
 125. Id. at 269. 
 126. See e.g., Liborio Stuppia et al., Epigenetics and Male Reproduction: The Consequences 
of Paternal Lifestyle on Fertility, Embryo Development, and Children Lifetime Health, 5 CLINICAL 
EPIGENETICS 120, 121 (2015). 
 127. Id. at 121.  Genetic mutation refers to a change in the actual DNA sequence, while 
epigenetic mutation refers to change in gene activity and expression that occurs absent DNA 
alteration.  Id.; Epigenetic Modifications Regulate Gene Expression, QIAGEN (2008), http://www. 
sabiosciences.com/pathwaymagazine/pathways8/epigenetic-modifications-regulate-gene-
expression.php. 
 128. Matthew D. Anway et al., Endocrine Disrupter Vinclozolin Induced Epigenetic 
Transgenerational Adult-Onset Disease, ENDOCRINOLOGY, 5515 (Sept. 14, 2006), http://press. 
endocrine.org/doi/pdf/10.1210/en.2006-0640. 
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can cause the development of certain cancers and kidney disease in future 
offspring via an epigenetic mechanism.129 
Conversely, as described in a recent scholarly article on epigenetics and the 
male reproductive system, many studies have focused on actual genetic 
mutation.130  Although these studies produce results that may not hold up as 
evidence in a court of law,131 they are indicative of the direction in which 
medical and scientific research is headed. 
While the results of these studies merely scrape the tip of the iceberg, it will 
only be a matter of time before courts are forced to deal with the implications of 
these studies on preconception torts.  Thus, how courts in the past have 
reconciled scientific advances with legal concepts can provide guidance for 
courts faced with the challenge of reconciling tort concepts with the potential 
implications of scientific advances. 
1.  DNA Evidence in Criminal Cases 
Although the studies examined above have yet to produce results that would 
likely be admissible in court, they are headed in the right direction.132  The 
introduction of genetic evidence to preconception tort actions will likely take a 
vacillating path to acceptance, similar to what occurred when DNA was first 
introduced as evidence in criminal cases.133  After an initial period of firm 
acceptance, “details of the laboratory procedures were questioned, and 
limitations were identified in the statistical and population-genetics models used 
in estimating the frequencies of the DNA types.”134 
As a result of these attacks, scientists and laboratories were forced to improve 
laboratory standards and perform additional research that would likely not be 
required within the scientific field.135  However, as with all advances, at some 
point lines must be drawn, which “requires an appreciation and understanding 
of the law . . . , the costs and benefits of the techniques, and the political and 
                                               
 129. Id. 
 130. Stuppia et al., supra note 126, at 128.  The authors provide the following overview of 
studies identifying genetic mutations as a result of substance exposure: 
Several studies [have] previously demonstrated the presence of a strong association 
between paternal occupational exposures to chemicals and harmful health outcomes in 
the offspring.  Feychting at al. demonstrated an increased risk of nervous system tumors 
related to paternal occupational exposure to pesticides and of leukemia related to 
woodwork by fathers.  Reid et al. evidenced the presence of high exposure to exhausts 
by paternal grandmothers of children with acute lymphoblastic leukemia. 
Id. 
 131. Goldberg, supra note 12, at 265. 
 132. Stuppia, et al., supra note 126, at 130–31. 
 133. See David H. Kaye, The Science of DNA Identification: From the Laboratory to the 
Courtroom (and Beyond), 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 409, 410–18 (2007). 
 134. Id. at 413–14. 
 135. See id. at 416–17. 
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ethical principles that foster a free society of autonomous individuals.”136  With 
this in mind, experts and scientists working on studies with potential 
applicability in the realm of preconception torts should not be discouraged by 
judicial resistance, but should instead be encouraged, as evidenced by the 
acceptance of DNA evidence in criminal cases. 
III.  A SYNTHESIS AND SLIDING-SCALE: THE PRESENTATION OF 
PRECONCEPTION TORTS BY PLAINTIFFS WILL FORCE THE COURTS TO 
COMMONLY RECOGNIZE PRECONCEPTION LIABILITY 
The judiciary is not solely responsible for defining and recognizing 
preconception tort liabilities stemming from exposure to harmful substances.  
Plaintiffs and outside actors must also be proactive in pushing courts to 
recognize such actions.137  This cannot be done by focusing on one aspect of the 
law, but rather requires a consideration of a range of issues—common tort 
concepts, evidentiary standards, and emerging scientific advances.  If courts are 
actively confronted with a thorough synthesis of the aforementioned factors that 
directly address the misgivings in recognizing preconception liability, courts 
will be forced to consider ways in which doctrinal tort concepts can be 
reconciled with modern advances in science and medicine.138 
A.  Causation and Duty Operate on a Sliding Scale 
The two most important components of preconception torts, duty and 
causation, should not be isolated from each other, but rather should operate on a 
sliding scale.  The isolation of causation and duty from each other strongly 
contributes to the refusal of courts to uphold preconception liability.139  
However, when not viewed in isolation, plaintiffs armed with causation 
comparable to what was present in Hegyes would have a viable opportunity to 
recover.140  Instead of precluding liability solely because the injury to a later-
conceived child is arbitrarily deemed unforeseeable, as it may open the door to 
limitless liability, courts need to seriously consider the facts in their entirety, 
which alone may limit the holding.141 
                                               
 136. Id. at 427. 
 137. Marchant, supra note 117, at 9–10, 25–26, 36; Gary E. Marchant, Genetic Data in Toxic 
Tort Litigation, 45-WTR BRIEF 22 (2016). 
 138. Marchant, supra note 117, at 9–10, 23, 25–26, 36. 
 139. See, e.g., Hegyes v. Unjian Enterprises, Inc., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85, 101-02 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1991) (refusing to recognize preconception liability where the defendant’s negligent driving clearly 
caused an injury to the reproductive system of the mother because no duty could exist to a child 
conceived three years later). 
 140. See Goldberg, supra note 12, at 269–71. 
 141. See id. at 285 (stating that “[t]here is little reason, neither for ‘pure’ legal considerations, 
nor for policy concerns, to prevent any preconception genetic tort claim from being brought before 
a trier of fact”). 
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1.  Using Facts to Limit Liability for the Courts 
In order for courts to alter the status quo in situations involving innovative or 
groundbreaking concepts that may have serious repercussions throughout the 
legal field, plaintiffs must provide them with a valid rationale to do so.142  One 
way to do this, particularly when dealing with complex, scientific material, is to 
emphasize the uniqueness of a preconception tort claim.143  With fewer than fifty 
preconception cases reaching appellate courts in the past twenty-four years, the 
tort is already a rarity.144 
The obscure facts that accompany many preconception tort actions make it 
difficult for plaintiffs to piece together a viable theory of liability at the outset.145  
For example, in Hegyes, following a car accident, the mother was fitted with a 
shunt that directly harmed her reproductive system and eventually caused an 
injury to her child.146  Imposing a duty on the negligent driver in this type of 
situation would not impose limitless liability for the preconceived child in all car 
accidents.147  If a mother were to injure her arm in a car accident, one would not 
assert that the driver is liable for any injuries a later-conceived child suffers.  
Therefore, the strength of causation and uniqueness of the incident enables 
courts to limit liability in an exacting way, thus reducing the fear of limitless 
liability. 
2.  Modern Scientific Advances Provide the Key to Establishing 
Preconception Causation 
With groundbreaking advancements in science and technology, plaintiffs can 
significantly strengthen causation arguments in preconception tort actions.  
Although plaintiffs still must prove general and specific causation, a 
combination of different types of evidence can make doing so much easier.148  
Courts generally accept epidemiological evidence and find it sufficient to 
                                               
 142. See Steven L. Winter, The Next Century of Legal Thought?, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 747, 
749 (2001) (contending that “the challenge of the lawyer’s craft is to devise ex ante (i.e., with 
predictability) a position that will prevail ex post.  To do this, a lawyer must construct an argument 
or draft a document that will convince some subsequent set of legal decision makers to take the 
desired action”). 
 143. Taylor, supra note 99, at 232 (noting that only a “few jurisdictions . . . have had the 
opportunity to address the preconception tort issue”). 
 144. Greenberg, supra note 3, at 342. 
 145. Taylor, supra note 99, at 232 (“The plaintiff will face a substantial burden of 
demonstrating foreseeability, duty and causation, and this burden will grow more onerous the 
further removed the plaintiff is in place and time from the tortious act.”). 
 146. Hegyes v. Unjian Enterprises, Inc., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85, 86–87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
 147. Cf. id. at 116 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[a]ny extra burden placed on drivers 
by making them responsible to postconceived children-and it seems unlikely to be a significant 
burden-would only serve to increase the degree of care drivers must exercise”). 
 148. Lin, supra note 68, at 1446–51. 
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establish general causation.149  On the contrary, courts generally do not accept 
temporal evidence, which uses the timing of exposure and injury to establish 
causation.150  However, a combination of epidemiological and temporal 
evidence can provide plaintiffs with an evidentiary foundation upon which to 
establish causation.151  Essentially, if the epidemiological evidence is strong 
enough to indicate that exposure to a substance significantly increases the 
likelihood of a certain injury, the temporal evidence can provide a way by which 
to discount the possibility that something else contributed to the injury.152  
Although this combination of evidence cannot function as a means by which to 
show specific causation, it lessens the emphasis placed on specific causation. 
In addition to strengthening epidemiological evidence, temporal evidence also 
provides the requisite link between general and specific causation.  One of the 
emerging methods of establishing specific causation, DNA microarrays  monitor 
genetic expressions when exposed to different environmental stimulants.153  
Thus, if used properly, DNA microarrays can establish specific causation.  
However, one weakness in this method is its inability to isolate the interaction 
to a single stimulant, with one hundred percent certainty.154  Again, this is where 
temporal evidence can supplement the plaintiff’s inability to completely isolate 
genetic expression.  Therefore, if a plaintiff can use a DNA microarray to 
establish a genetic alteration and temporal evidence to narrow the causation to a 
specific time, then the plaintiff may effectively satisfy the requirements of 
general and specific causation.155 
3.  Establishing Liability Through Narrow Relationships and Foreseeable 
Consequences 
Alternatively, when causation is not as clear as it was in Hegyes, an imposition 
of a stringent duty can aid courts in recognizing preconception tort liability.156  
This type of stringent duty is most commonly seen in relation to a woman’s 
                                               
 149. See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1239–41 (E.D.N.Y. 
1985), aff’d sub nom, In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig. MDL No. 381, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 
1987) (citing numerous cases in which epidemiological evidence was heavily relied upon); see also 
Gold, supra note 70, at 379–80 (noting that parties must rely on the relative risks of exposure to 
toxic substances established by epidemiological evidence because of the difficulty of proving 
individual causation in toxic tort claims). 
 150. See, e.g., Young v. Burton, 567 F. Supp. 2d 121, 128 (D.D.C. 2008) (noting that temporal 
evidence “is generally insufficient to establish causation”). 
 151. See id. at 128–29. 
 152. See id. 
 153. Childs, supra note 91, at 441–42. 
 154. Id. at 444. 
 155. See Young, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 127–28; see also Childs, supra note 91, at 442–44. 
 156. See Hegyes v. Unjian Enterprises, Inc., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85, 90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (“In a 
preconception tort case, as in any negligence case, there is an overwhelming need to keep liability 
within reasonable bounds and to limit the areas of actionable causation by applying the concept of 
duty.”). 
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reproductive system.157  For example, California recognizes a duty to the 
unconceived only when the defendant’s conduct involves services or products 
relating to the reproductive system.158  A major factor implicit in this line of 
reasoning is foreseeability because “[a]ny action that would foreseeably harm a 
woman’s reproductive system and her ability to carry a child to term would 
presumably also foreseeably harm a child she conceives in the future.”159  
Therefore, advances in technology can establish that an injury resulting in 
genetic damage to a parent could foreseeably result in an injury suffered by his 
or her progeny.160 This essentially mirrors limiting preconception liability to 
circumstances concerning a woman’s reproductive system.161  By emphasizing 
the foreseeability of tortious actions prior to conception, causation can be 
implicitly established, which will reduce the scrutiny of causation. 
B.  The Possibility of Legislative Action In Recognizing Preconception Tort 
Liability 
What may seem like a viable option, very few courts have considered the role 
of the legislature in adjudicating preconception tort actions.  Within the sparse 
judicial and academic commentary on this issue, a few common threads of 
reasoning are persistent.  First, if courts are worried about unlimited liability, it 
is the job of the legislature to draw proper lines.162  While this may be true, there 
is a strong argument that common tort concepts may actually draw that line 
themselves: “[w]ith each successive generation, the burden on the plaintiff of 
proving causation and foreseeability grows more and more difficult.”163  
However, if courts remain wary of opening the floodgates of litigation even in 
the face of this logic, the legislature’s ability to limit liability affords the courts 
no excuse to refrain from imposing a duty to the unconceived child.164 
Moving a step further, Peters v. Texas Instruments Inc.165 examined the role 
of the legislature in imposing a preconception tort duty.166  Highlighting the 
inherent complexities of preconception tort actions, the court held that the 
                                               
 157. See id. at 86–97, 89–90. 
 158. See, e.g., id. at 89–90 (noting that a duty to the unconceived in California exists only when 
a defendant’s conduct involves providing medical services or products relating to the reproductive 
process). 
 159. Greenberg, supra note 3, at 355. 
 160. See Young, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 127–28; Childs, supra note 91, at 442–44; Greenberg, supra 
note 3, at 354–56. 
 161. See Greenberg, supra note 3, at 354–56. 
 162. See Taylor, supra note 99, at 231–32 (“If, for public policy reasons, the state legislatures 
decide that a line must be drawn, then it is the duty of the legislatures, not the courts, to draw the 
line.”). 
 163. Id. at 232. 
 164. Id. at 229–30, 232. 
 165. C.A. No. 10C–06–043 JRJ, 2011 WL 4686518, at *6–7 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2011). 
 166. Id. 
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legislature is better suited to define preconception liability.167  Although this 
assertion may be true, it seems that the legislature’s role in formulating a duty 
may be misplaced, as courts are regularly relied upon to interpret and analyze 
scientific information post-Daubert. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Currently, courts are being forced to weigh a multitude of factors in evaluating 
whether to impose preconception liability, such as foreseeability, special 
relationships, causation, and policy implications.168  While courts commonly 
balance these factors when deciding whether to impose general tort liability, the 
complexity and scope of preconception liability poses a substantial challenge.  It 
follows, that with advances in medicine, science and technology, the causal 
effects of certain actions or substances will become more definite, which will 
allow courts to impose liability without overextending duty to a limitless 
population.169 
In order to normalize the recognition of preconception tort liability, plaintiffs 
and outside actors must identify weaknesses in the judicial rationale that has 
denied recovery.  Thus, a complete synthesis of scientifically-advanced 
evidence, causation, and duty can establish preconception tort liability.  Implicit 
in this synthesis is the notion that causation and duty operate on a sliding scale, 
where a higher percentage of one requires less of the other.  Ultimately, using 
the facts of a given situation, plaintiffs must identify the strength of their action, 
whether foreseeability or causation, and use that strength to give the judiciary 
no choice but to recognize preconception tort liability and begin to reconcile 








                                               
 167. Id. 
 168. See e.g., Lough v. Rolla Women’s Clinic, Inc. 866 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Mo. 1993) 
(“Foreseeability is the paramount factor in determining existence of a duty . . . .”); Hegyes v. Unjian 
Enterprises, Inc., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85, 90–91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (discussing the role of special 
relationships and causation as underlying factors within preconception tort duty); Goldberg, supra 
note 12, at 270–71 (“If issues of proximate cause and duty turn on policy considerations, the logical 
question becomes what policy considerations have prompted the majority of courts to deny 
proximate cause and duty to plaintiffs in preconception genetic torts?”). 
 169. Marchant, supra note 137, at 23 (“New genetic methods and data have the potential to fill 
these scientific uncertainties and data gaps in toxic tort litigation, thus making toxic tort litigation 
both more accurate and fair.  At the same time, these same genetic data have the potential to make 
toxic tort litigation even more complex, contentious, and ethically problematic.”). 
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